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ARGUMENT
Defendant

did

not

waive

her

right

to

constitutionality of the inventory search in this case.
asserted

the unconstitutionality

Motion to Suppress.

Defendant

of the search
reasserted

hearing on the Motion to Suppress.

argue

the

Defendant

in her written

the argument

in the

Specifically on pages 28-30 of

the transcript of the hearing, counsel for defendant makes the
following statements:
COURT:

Ms. Lachmar, anything further?

MS. LACHMAR: I just want to point out that as I was writing
this memorandum I was searching for a statutory basis for the
inventory. In other words, some kind of statutory authority given
to police officers to remove this vehicle. It seems to me there
ought to be something on the books that says something about
traffic accidents, that says if a car has been in an accident, is
disabled, and the driver is removed, that there ought to be
something in writing that they need to remove those vehicles, but
I could find nothing. (T. 28)

"What I wanted to point out was that as I was searching for
something in writing to show that the police officers in this
instance were required to remove the vehicle, I had difficulty
finding anything. As I laid out everything that I could think of,
as you know, the officers justified the search as pursuant to a DUI
arrest. And as I pointed out, that couldn!t have been the basis.
Then I looked in other places, statutory and otherwise, to
find a basis for the inventory and was unable to come up with
anything, except for the possible exception of their own
regulations, which say you can remove it in an emergency situation
to protect the vehicle, I believe.
But that had no statutory
support for it.
So I think in this case, what the Supreme Court has said in
other instances, particularly in State vs. Hygh and so forth, that
if there is no statutory basis for the inventory, you then need to
look at the circumstances and say was it justified based on the
circumstances that existed here. So thatfs what we 1 re looking at.
Just on the circumstances, were they justified in inventorying the
vehicle? That's what the court needs to look at.
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As I pointed out, I think that what Hygh says, and I'm not
sure that Lopez undoes this, is that you can't conduct an inventory
search for purely investigatory reasons.
If you're doing an
inventory search you have to have a legitimate basis for it.
that's what I was having trouble finding is what was their
legitimate basis for the inventory search statutorily. I couldn't
find anything. So I guess that court would have to find that there
was a justification for it under the circumstances in order to hold
for the State in this case." (T. 30) pages 30-31.
At the close of the hearing, defense counsel discusses the
issue of the inventory search, stating again that she could find no
legitimate statutory basis for the search and indicating that the
Court would have to find a circumstantial basis for upholding the
search.

Defendant

did

not

knowingly,

intelligently

and

affirmatively waive the defense by making an equivocal statement at
one point in her oral argument.

She re-asserted the claim in the

oral argument, as well as in her written motion to suppress and her
appellate court brief.
THE INVENTORY SEARCH WAS UNLAWFUL BECAUSE
THERE WAS NO STATUTORY BASIS FOR AN IMPOUND AND
SURROUNDING CIRCUMSTANCES DID NOT JUSTIFY
A WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S
VEHICLE
The State cites State V. Sterger, 808 P. 2d 122 (Utah App.
1991) as providing a precedence for the inventory search in this
case. However, in Sterger, the vehicle was impounded and remained
in police custody for the following reasons:
"Defendant's car was partially blocking the road in a remote
area where the accident

occurred.

shattered and the car inoperable.

The front windshield was

All of the occupants had been

taken for medical attention and Draper had no opportunity to ask
defendant what he wanted done with the car.
5

'(T)he existence or

absence of justification for the impoundment of an automobile may
be

determined

from

the

surrounding

circumstances.11

Johnson, 745 P.2d 452, 454 (Utah 1987)'"

State v.

In the instant case,

defendant told the officers what she wanted done with her vehicle.
She indicated that she wanted it turned over to her father or to
her friend who owned a towing service in Honeyville.

The vehicle

was completely off of the roadway in a barrow pit.

There is no

indication that the vehicle was inoperable.
case

did

not

impound

the vehicle

until

The officer in this
after

searching

its

contents. He did not impound the vehicle, because no facts existed
at that point in time which would have justified an impound.
"In order to support a findng that a valid inventory search has
taken place, the court must first determine whether there was
reasonable and proper justification for the impoundment of the
vehicle."

State v. Rice 717 P.2d 695, 696 (Utah 1986).

"Absent a

statutory basis justifying impoundment, we look to the totality of
the surrounding circumstances to determine the reasonableness of
the seizure of the vehicle." Rice at 696.

In holding for the

defendant in Rice at 696 the Court stated as follows:
"Cache County has no written standards or procedures for
police impoundment of motor vehicles.
It is undisputed that
defendant's truck was safely locked and parked in a parking lot
behind a law office. There is no evidence that there the vehicle
posed any danger to the officers or the public. Defendant was not
permitted to have someone pick up his locked truck from the parking
lot or to arrange other disposition. Defendant was neither advised
of the search in advance nor allowed an opportunity to be present."
Likewise in the instant case, defendant was not advised of the
search

in advance nor allowed an opportunity

to be present.

Defendant's vehicle was in a barrow pit, adjacent to a county road
6

and did not pose any danger to the officers or the public.
Defendant was attempting to make arrangements for disposition of
the vehicle as she was being taken away by ambulance.

She wanted

the car turned over to her father or a friend of hers who operated
a towing service in Honeyville.
intended

She had no idea the officers

to search her car or that requesting

a tow truck,

effectively constituted a consent to search.
Further, there was no emergency requiring removal of the
vehicle.

It was not obstructing traffic and it could have been

locked in order to secure its contents.

An inventory search may

only be conducted "...if the officers conduct an inventory search
of

a

properly

impounded

vehicle,

in

good

reasonable, standardized police procedures."

faith,

following

State v. Gray 851

P.2d (Utah App 1993) As stated in a footnote to Gray, court's do
not

wish

to encourage

officer's

to

take

the path of

least

resistance with respect to searches:
"Moreover, to rule otherwise would penalize the over-cautious
officer for his or her attempts to secure a warrant and would
encourage officers to use the path of least resistance, that is, to
conduct an inventory search in every case without attempting to
first secure a search warrant.
Such result would be clearly
contrary to our justice system's preference for warrants." Id. at
1221.
The officers

in this case had possession of defendant's

vehicle and keys because an automobile accident had occurred.
Because there was no statutory basis for an impound at that point
in time and because there was particularized suspicion of criminal
activity, the officers should not have taken the "path of least
resistance", but should have obtained a warrant.
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EXIGENT CIRCUMSTANCES, JUSTIFYING
A WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE
DID NOT EXIST, AS THE VEHICLE HAD NO DRIVER
Exigent circumstances, justifying a warrantless search of
defendant's vehicle did not exist, because the vehicle had no
driver.

As indicated earlier in appellant's brief, the Supreme

Court in State v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 469 (Utah 1990) favors
warrants under these circumstances:
"As Justice Zimmerman explained in Hygh: "Once the threat
that the suspect will injure the officers with concealed weapons or
will destroy evidence is gone, there is no persuasive reason why
the officers cannot take the time to secure a warrant. Such a
requirement
would
present
little
impediment
to
police
investigations, especially in light of the ease with which warrants
can be obtained under Utah's telephonic warrant statute, U.C.A.,
1953, Section 7-23-4(2)."
This approach was affirmed in State v. Anderson, 910 P. 2d 1229
(Utah 1996).
The police could have secured the vehicle and obtained a
telephonic warrant.

They did not need to summon the tow truck

until after they had obtained a warrant and searched the vehicle.
Therefore, no emergency existed.

There was no danger that the

evidence was going to be lost. The police simply failed to observe
the basic

constitutional

mandate

searching private property.
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to obtain a warrant

before

CONCLUSION
The trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress
should

be

overturned,

because

the

inventory

search

was not

authorized by statute and was not justified under the facts and
circumstances of this case.

Law enforcement officers should have

obtained a warrant as probable cause existed and there were no
exigent circumstances to justify a warrantless search.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS

^JQ^dav of January, 1997.

BARBARA KING LACHMAR
Attorney for Defendant
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